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Through an accumulation of laws rather than by military means, a particular misery is 
intensified and entrenched. This slow violence, this cold violence, no less than the other 
kind, ought to be looked at and understood.  
     (Cole 2015: 19) 
In September 2018, Israel’s Supreme Court confirmed that the planned eviction and 
demolition of the small West Bank village of Khan al-Ahmar, originally authorized by the 
Court earlier in the year, should go ahead. The residents of that village are Palestinian 
Bedouin who had been expelled by the Israeli state in 1952 from their original lands in the 
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Naqab desert. Six decades on and that state, as a colonizing regime in occupied territory, 
asserts that the community can no longer stay in the home they had made in Khan al-
Ahmar. The community maintains that this home is on land owned by Palestinians long 
pre-dating Israel’s entry to the West Bank in 1967. The Supreme Court refused to accept 
these ownership credentials, and instead upheld the government’s position that the land 
had become “state-owned.” As such it can be designated for civilian colony usage should 
the state so wish. The Israeli state had announced a plan in 2012 to relocate the community 
elsewhere, and demolished a number of structures in the village between 2015 and 2017. 
Khan al-Ahmar is of particular significance because of its location in the “E1” corridor 
which, if settled, would allow a contiguous Jewish-Israeli presence to stretch from 
Jerusalem all the way across the center of the West Bank. After the Supreme Court ruling, 
Israeli settlers descended on the area singing in triumph at having redeemed the land. 
Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman similarly approved: “Khan al-Ahmar will be evicted! 
I commend the judges of the court for a brave and necessary decision in the face of 
hypocritical attacks orchestrated by Abu Mazen, the left and European countries. No one 
is above the law. No one will prevent us from exercising our sovereignty.”1  
Which is simply to say that the law remains central to colonial violence and 
expansion. Beyond the state’s foundational law-making and law-preserving violence, in 
this context we also see its annexationist (law-expanding) violence at work. The life of the 
law is embedded in the processes through which the settler state is created, and through 
which settler sovereignty is reified, maintained and stretched at the frontier. In 2018, the 
target is Khan al-Ahmar. Before that, Sheikh Jarrah in East Jerusalem and Susya in the 
south Hebron Hills and Khirbet Tana in the Jordan Valley, and many more Palestinian 
communities besides. The Israeli legal system has been central to the advancement and 
legitimation of some of the core tactics of settler-colonialism: appropriation, eviction, 
demolition, and displacement. 
Indeed, life in Palestine is stilted and suffocated and strangled through law—from 
everyday mundanities to political gravities, from deliberately arbitrary administrative 
rabbit holes to the systemic segregation and ghettoization that defines racialized rule over 
a subordinated population. The law’s function has long been clear to the Palestinians who 
constitute that population, and becomes evident soon enough to anyone who spends time 
there. Teju Cole travelled to and around the West Bank for the Palestinian Festival of 
Literature in 2014, and in his reflections neatly captured the nature of the law’s slow, cold 
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violence. It complements—yet is clearly discernible from—the hot violence of intermittent 
military salvo:  “the viciousness of the law must be taken as seriously as the cruelties of 
war. … Israel uses an extremely complex legal and bureaucratic apparatus to dispossess 
Palestinians of their land, hoping perhaps to forestall accusations of a brutal land grab. No 
one is fooled by any of this” (Cole 2015: 23). 
Not being fooled is one thing. Fully unpicking the depth and breadth of the 
workings of that complex legal and bureaucratic apparatus is quite another. In The ABC of 
the OPT: A Legal Lexicon of the Israeli Control over the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Orna Ben-Naftali, Michael Sfard and Hedi Viterbo provide a dense and detailed analysis 
of this heavily legalized control regime. The legal scholarship on the nature and 
mechanisms of Israel’s rule over the Palestinians continues to be extensive. This includes 
significant recent contributions from Mazen Masri on the modes by which Israel’s 
constitutional order downgrades its Palestinian citizens and excludes them from certain 
legal privileges (Masri 2017a), from Yael Berda on the overbearing bureaucracy of the 
permit regime in the West Bank (Berda 2017), as well as Noura Erakat’s forthcoming 
appraisal of how the strategic deployment of law at certain key junctures has shaped current 
conditions in the question of Palestine (Erakat 2019). There is no shortage of critical 
analysis of the myriad legal aspects of the situation in Palestine. Ben-Naftali, Sfard and 
Viterbo’s book is nonetheless a timely and significant addition. Presented in a lexicon 
format of 26 full-length chapters, it is both intricate in its technical analysis and  expansive 
in its theoretical horizons. The chapters, each individually written by one of the three 
contributors, span an alphabet of titles that vary in aperture to encompass specific legal 
mechanisms in some instances, more general thematic categories of law in others, as well 
as broader conceptual lenses. It is worth reciting the list to illustrate its range: Assigned 
Residence, Border/Barrier, Combatants, Deportations, Export of Knowledge, Future-
Oriented Mechanisms, Geneva Law, House Demolitions, Investigations, Jewish 
Settlements, Kinship, Lawfare, Military Courts, Nomos, Outside/Inside, Proportionality, 
Quality of Life, Regularization Law, Security Prisoners, Temporary/Indefinite, Usufruct, 
Violence, War Crimes, X Rays, Youth, and Zone. There are, by nature, certain categories 
or headings omitted. No doubt another set of authors would have chosen to organize such 
a book by a very different set of chapter themes. But the sheer volume of material covered 
under the headings that the book did deploy renders it as extensive as a single text could 
hope to be.  
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The variety in scope and approach of the chapters—and the somewhat eclectic 
mixture at times of theory and method, of doctrinal and critical analysis—reflects the 
interests and experiences of the three authors. Ben-Naftali is one of Israel’s prominent 
international law scholars and theoreticians. She has written extensively on legal aspects 
of Israeli practices, including an influential article framing the situation in the West Bank 
and Gaza as “Illegal Occupation” (Ben-Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli 2005). Sfard has been 
one of the most active Jewish-Israeli human rights lawyers arguing Palestinian cases over 
the last two decades, while also remaining an engaged intellectual who has published 
thoughtful pieces reflecting on his experiences as a practitioner and on the role of the law 
in stabilizing and normalizing the Israeli occupation (Sfard 2009; Sfard 2018a). Viterbo is 
a legal academic trained in Israel and Britain who has done significant research—among 
other things—analogizing elements of North American, Australian and Israeli settler 
colonialism (Viterbo 2017). The common denominator between them is an intimate 
knowledge of the Israeli legal system and its judicial renderings.  
From this standpoint, they embark on a detailed exploration of Israel’s occupation 
policies and practices since 1967. The core threads of analysis running through the book 
converge to demonstrate how law has played a significant role in the making and 
maintaining of the reality of this occupation. The authors suggest that “the Israeli control 
of the OPT is possibily the most legalized such regime in world history” (2). This is based 
on the profusion of law that has been generated over the lifetime of the occupation and the 
extensive involvement of government lawyers, military judges and Israel’s Supreme Court 
in governing Palestinian lives. In their theoretical framing at the outset, Ben-Naftali, Sfard 
and Viterbo position this in relation to conceptual debates around the nature of a “law–
rule–exception relationship,” and Israel’s life-long state of emergency. Like much of the 
scholarship on the state of exception, they do this with reference more to Carl Schmitt and 
Giorgio Agamben than to the literature on colonial emergency governance, which in some 
respects may be more apposite (Hussain 2003; Kostal 2005; Anghie 2009; Kolsky 2010). 
They are clear in asserting, however, that “far from being a lawless or extralegal space, the 
state of exception brims with law—with legal texts, procedures, mechanisms, and 
discourses” (19). This gestures to the idea of the norm/exception distinction as somewhat 
of a liberal fiction.  
Time and again through the book, legalism is exposed as the underwriter of the 
control regime and the enabler of its violence. Law, as Ben-Naftali puts it in her chapter on 
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the interplay between international humanitarian law and the administering of Israel’s 
occupation, “is part of the problem. Too much of it exacerbates the problem” (160). The 
authors deftly illustrate the mechanics of this when it comes to home demolitions, 
population displacement, family separation, land appropriation, military impunity, and 
much more. The book shows that law is not merely used instrumentally in service of power; 
it is itself a form of power. In Sfard’s analysis of the legalised extraction of natural 
resources from the occupied territory, “plunder is passed off as benefiting the occupied. It 
drives their economy. This is the ultimate colonialist argument and state of mind: the 
subjugation and exploitation of the occupied is rationalized by the court in the best tradition 
of colonial apology for conquest and the superiority of the conqueror” (430).   
The role of the Supreme Court in constructing the nomos of Israel’s control 
regime is a recurring theme through the book. The Court interprets and applies legal rules 
against the backdrop of a narrative framework that it has consistently advanced, 
particularly since the initiation of the second Palestinian intifada in 2000. The narrative is 
that of the civilised in the face of the barbaric, evoking Theodor Herzl’s characterization 
of a Jewish state in Palestine as “a rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization 
as opposed to barbarism” (Herzl 1896: 18). It is the narrative of a difficult situation for a 
freedom-loving democracy engaged in a defensive war, doing what it can to weigh the 
rights of the othered population against its own security needs. The law thus becomes a 
game of balance and proportionality. In this equation the Israeli state is the victim of, rather 
than the perpetrator of, the denial of Palestinian self-determination. The subjective 
perspective of the military commander is, more often than not, the lens through which the 
Supreme Court views the question before it. This narrative of defensive democracy leads 
Ben-Naftali to wonder “if it is indeed the democracy which is defending itself, or rather 
the hegemonic Jewish ethnos, safeguarding exclusively the freedom of the Jews, including 
their freedom to settle in the OPT at the expense of Palestinian individual and collective 
human rights, thus defending its ethnocratic and not its democratic regime” (41).  
That question goes to the core of the conundrum of Palestine/Israel. Sfard’s 
chapter on “Jewish Settlements” frames the transfer of Jewish-Israeli civilians into the 
West Bank as having “transformed” the occupation from a military operation into a project 
of settler-colonialism. The book limits its mandate to the occupied territories, and does not 
systematically address the underlying nature of the Israeli state itself. Palestinian 
scholarship diligently seeks to remind us that this state is a settler-colonial enterprise, and 
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that settler-colonialism is indeed a fundamental feature of the Israeli legal system (Masri 
2017b). The settler colonial analytic is “an essential lens to understand the myriad forms 
of dispossession experienced by Palestinians from the late nineteenth century” and one that 
allows us to historicize the colonization of Palestine as a process that began long before 
1948 (Bhandar and Ziadah 2016). Mainstream international legal discourse, by contrast, 
continues to cling on to the fiction that the military occupation of Palestinian territories can 
be seen as distinct from, and analysed in isolation from, the constitutional structures of the 
Israeli state. The settler-colonial nature of those structures is seen most starkly in Israel’s 
citizenship, residence and immigration laws, which coalesce to subordinate Palestinian 
citizens inside Israel and keep Palestinian refugees outside. This has been recently 
reinforced in a new constitutional statute in the form of the 2018 Basic Law: Israel as the 
Nation-State of the Jewish People, which has generated widespread condemnation even 
among some Zionist Israelis. While the law is for the most part a constitutional restatement 
of long-existing reality of Jewish privilege vis-à-vis non-Jewish citizens and residents in 
Israeli law, it lifts the veil on liberal Zionism’s claim that Israel can be both the exclusive 
state of the Jewish people and a democratic state at the same time. Israeli jurists and legal 
scholars who have circulated to and from Europe and the Anglophone settler colonies over 
recent decades, presenting Israeli constitutionalism as a progressive template, have 
produced “a kind of monoracial echo chamber—that can only see the Nation-State Law as 
a betrayal of Israel’s promise rather than a sadly predictable fulfillment of it” (Li 2018). 
And while many commentators issued assurances that this Basic Law was only a symbolic 
piece of legislative performance which would not have any practical effect, it has already 
been interpreted and applied by an Israeli court in a manner that implies an overt 
discrimination between Jewish and non-Jewish victims of crime in Israel (Abraham 2018). 
With its focus on appraising the occupation’s law, Ben-Naftali, Sfard and 
Viterbo’s book does not attempt to fully delve this deep into Israel’s constitutional make-
up. Another entire alphabet would perhaps be needed to do justice to the modes by which 
the ideologies and constructs of settler-colonialism, race, nationhood and citizenship are 
instituted and constituted in Israel’s juridical order (and filtered on both sides of the Green 
Line in similar and divergent ways, as well as deployed to patrol the borders of historic 
Palestine). The book does nonetheless allude to the impacts of the foundations upon which 
Zionism is predicated. One structural-legal paradigm which it illustrates particularly 
clearly within the context of the occupation is that of apartheid as a racialized system of 
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discrimination, segregation and domination. 
The apartheid paradigm (Davis 2003; Soske and Jacobs 2015; Pappé 2015; Clarno 
2017) is explicitly discussed at times, and implicitly permeates the analysis almost all the 
way through the book, describing what is effectively a dual legal system in the West Bank: 
“one code for settlers, another for Palestinians … applied in a setting in which the colonized 
are dominated by the colonizers, with a clear intention of maintaining that domination” 
(Sfard 2018c). Two prominent examples of this are seen in Ben-Naftali’s reflections on a 
form of segregated road system instituted in parts of the occupied territory, and Sfard’s 
analysis of the “seam zone” permit regime. 
Ben-Naftali tells the story of Road 443 as one of apartheid and annexation: “The 
story of the physical road epitomizes the the long and winding judicial road from Israel to 
Greater Israel, a state the effective sovereignty of which incorporates the West Bank” 
(152). A Palestinian teachers’ cooperative society bought some land north of Jerusalem in 
the 1970s, and successfully applied for permission from the Israeli authorities for the 
construction of a teachers’ housing complex. When they began building, Jewish 
industrialists operating nearby informed the military commander. The building permits 
were suspended and then cancelled. This decision was upheld by the Supreme Court, which 
rejected the teachers’ plan on grounds of its proximity to an Israeli industrial zone and 
security plantations in the West Bank, and its location within an area slated for 
expropriation for the purpose of road construction.  
The teachers’ cooperative then continued its legal struggle against said road 
construction. In 1982, the Supreme Court ruled that the expropriation of private land by 
the military commander was not only permissible but necessary to uphold the obligations 
of the occupying power. This was on the basis of an assertion that a road in this area was 
needed to serve the Palestinian population. According to Ben-Naftali, however, the military 
authorities “presented no evidence that the needs of the local occupied population were 
motivating the planning of the road. In fact, documents dating back to the mid-1970s 
disclose the political motivation behind it: to enlarge Jerusalem and construct a wide Jewish 
strap cutting through the West Bank. The state, thus, was misleading the court, and the 
court allowed itself to be misled” (155).  
Road 443 was constructed and initially served both Israelis and Palestinians until 
the early 2000s, when Palestinians were banned by military order from accessing it. A 
Palestinian petition to the Supreme Court contested the legitimacy of this ban on the 
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grounds that it was counter to the original justification for the construction of the road (as 
previously presented to the Court) and that it amounted to a form of apartheid. In its 2009 
decision,2 the Supreme Court ruled that the military commander had exceeded his authority 
in banning Palestinians completely from using Road 443. Ben-Naftali notes that the 
judgment is exceptional—both because “the court rarely accepts petitions against decisions 
of the military commander,” but also because it ruled against the commander at the same 
time as it “significantly expanded the scope of the military commander authority” (156). 
The Court’s judgment extended that authority to the protection of illegal settlers even 
though they are not protected persons under occupation law, and to the state security of 
Israel itself rather than merely to security needs within the occupied territory. For Ben-
Naftali, this judicial construction of a much broader scope of authority for the military 
commander reflects Israel’s expanionist drive and amounts to the translation, by law, of 
the political theology of a “Greater Israel” (with sovereignty over the West Bank territory, 
though not necessarily any social contract with its Palestinian inhabitants) into a normative 
reality.  
The judiciary’s unease with suggestions of apartheid are evident in the assertions 
of then President of the Court, Dorit Beinisch, that the apartheid analogy is an extreme 
argument which “it is essential to avoid.” So the rationale of the judgment was based on an 
assessment of the degree of authority that the military commander possesses, rather than 
on the substantive principle of whether segregation is permissible. While the military 
commander’s expanded authority was not constructed by the Court as unlimited, and while 
this ruling went against the occupying forces on paper, the Court did not order Israel to 
provide any specific remedy to the situation. It left it up to the state to come up with its 
own solution to comply with the judgment. That “solution” involved nominally opening 
up the road to Palestinian traffic, but was followed by closures of most of the junction 
points between road 443 and the Palestinian villages that it passes. The result, for Ben-
Naftali, is that “for all intents and purposes, the road remains virtually segregated” (159) 
and judicial discourse participates in the making of an apartheid reality. 
Around the same time as Palestinian access to Road 443 had been barred in the 
early 2000s, Israel had also begun construction of the Wall and its associated infrastructure 
in the West Bank. In the context of a series of litigation contesting the legitimacy of this 
infrastructure, Sfard filed a petition in 2004 against the permit system that the Israeli 
authorities deployed to restrict Palestinian movement in and out of the “seam zone” 
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between the Wall and the Green Line. This permit regime “was designed in such a way as 
to absolve Israelis—defined as Israeli citizens and permanent residents, people eligible 
under Israel’s Law of Return, that is, anyone who is Jewish…of the need to obtain a permit” 
(332). They are free to travel in and out of the zone whenever they wish. Whereas the other 
group defined in the military order closing the area (“in practice: Palestinians”) require all 
sorts of permits to enter the zone, work in it, remain in it overnight, and exit the zone, 
rendering the system “clearly a legal regime of separation and discrimination based on 
nationality/ethnicity” (332).  
The petition implored the Court to acknowledge the reality this creates: “Let us 
correctly define the legal structure described above by its full name: the web that the 
declaration and the orders have spun in the seam zone is an intolerable, illegal, immoral 
legal apartheid” (Sfard 2018a: 286–87). Sfard recounts that this was, to the best of his 
knowledge, the first time Israeli actions were referred to in the Supreme Court as apartheid, 
describing the amended 2006 version of the petition as “perhaps the boldest I had ever 
written. An entire section was dedicated to a description of the Pass Laws that restricted 
travel by black people in apartheid South Africa. We argued that there was a lot of 
similarity between the Israeli seam zone permit system and the disgraceful Pass Laws of 
that dark era. In that case, as in this one, the freedom of movement of a certain group of 
people was restricted and made subject to permits. … For this reason we used the word 
‘apartheid’ explicitly” (Sfard 2018a: 331).  
In the hearings, Beinisch was again “clearly uncomfortable” with the thought of 
having to address that argument and its implications, and in the eventual 2011 judgment3 
duly “drowned our grave allegations of institutionalized discrimination, collective 
punishment, and apartheid in a gluey puddle of ‘proportionality’.” The Court did not 
dispute the existence of discrimination per se, but indicated that even discrimination is a 
question of proportionality and found there to be a legitimate security “rationale for treating 
Palestinians differently” (Sfard 2018a: 333). In a similar fashion to that by which racism 
is treated in certain media and socio-political terrains as “debatable”—that what counts 
as racism and who gets to define it can be mobilized as a subject of debate (Titley 2016) 
and thus often explained away as (not racist, but) “legitimate concerns”—codified 
racial discrimination in the legal terrain here is something that can be balanced and 
justified. For Sfard, institutionalised and absolute discrimination of this manner cannot be 
considered in the realm of a cost-benefit analysis of rights versus security, and is 
equivalent to the 
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apartheid regimes in southern Africa and the regime of racial segregation that existed in 
the southern United States. Beyond the specifics of this case, he has written more generally 
that “a person would have to be unconscious not to pick up the whiff of apartheid 
everywhere there is a settlement. Israel has created not only an occupation that has persisted 
for generations but also a regime where one group discriminates against the other for the 
sole purpose of preserving its control and supremacy. This is the very core of the legal 
definition of apartheid” (Sfard 2018a: 127).  
That international legal definition is of course based on (but not specific to) the 
experiences in southern Africa. There were three dominant features or “pillars” of apartheid 
in South Africa (Dugard and Reynolds 2013). The first entailed racial categorization and 
discrimination between different groups of the population, institutionalized in law and 
systemic in discriminating between them in all spheres of life, from labor rights and 
political participation to education, housing, movement and residence, all the way down to 
segregated access to public transport, parks, and beaches (what was referred to as “petty 
apartheid”). The second pillar was the fragmentation of South Africa into different 
geographic areas, which were allocated by law to different racial groups. This was the basis 
for the policy of “grand apartheid” which provided for the establishment of “Bantustans” 
in which denationalized black South Africans were to be forced to reside, in order to 
preserve white supremacy over the rest of the territory of South Africa. These 
segregationist policies were propped up by the third pillar of apartheid, a web of so-called 
security laws and policies that were widely employed to suppress any opposition to the 
apartheid regime and to reinforce the system of racial domination, by providing for 
administrative detention, censorship, banning, torture and extrajudicial killing. In all of 
this, the law was omnipresent.  
Given the weight of history and suffering, ‘apartheid’ is not a term that the African 
National Congress or any other movement that struggled against institutionalized racist 
domination in southern Africa will use lightly. In South Africa, forced evictions and the 
pass laws were two cogs in the racial-legal machine that were of profound material 
significance and enduring symbolic weight. The significance of an ANC-led South African 
government describing Israeli practices as reminiscent of apartheid cannot be 
underestimated: Israeli military order 1650 is “reminiscent of pass laws under apartheid 
South Africa,”4 policies of Jewish settlement and forcible displacement of Palestinians are 
“reminiscent of apartheid forced removals.”5 
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As I conclude this essay in mid-October 2018, Israel’s military has surrounded 
Khan al-Amhar and its bulldozers have begun to level the ground around the village in 
preparation for its demolition.6 The image of the colonial frontier is vivid: “the leadership 
of the Israeli civil administration, the Israeli body which administers the occupied 
territories, were seen on a nearby hilltop with maps in their hands.”7 The only lingering 
hope for the community is that through their own steadfastness and the visibility of the 
solidarity they have received, they may be able to prevent the destruction of the village by 
disobedience of the law. For in the story of Palestinian displacements, the role and reality 
of Israel’s law is clear. Territory is occupied by force and earmarked for settlement. Land 
is recategorized by legal order of the military. The Supreme Court rules that the village 
should be evicted and demolished. Such processes illustrate the collusion of law as the 
companion of force in the colonization of land. As Sfard (2018b) puts it: “The 
occupation is built on three cornerstones: the gun, the settlement, and the law. The law is 
what props up the edifice of occupation and prevents it from crashing down.” Viterbo’s 
chapter on “Lawfare” offers an interesting exploration of the tactical possibilities that 
remain through engaging in legal work, and there are pressure points in international 
law that may yet contribute to Palestinian emancipation and equality. But what is most 
evident from Ben-Naftali, Sfard and Viterbo’s intervention is that in Israel/Palestine 
dismantling the structures of occupation and apartheid requires political imagination 
and articulation beyond the lexicon of law. 
NOTES 
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Statement: Israeli Infiltration Order 1650 (21 April 2010).
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6. Israel bulldozers enter Khan al-Ahmar in advance of demolition. Al-Jazeera (16
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7. Israel deploys army to Khan al-Ahmar. Middle East Monitor (11 October 2018).
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